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1. Introduction
Before the post-1978 economic reform, China’s economic management structure was
modeled principally on that of the former Soviet Union, an essential feature of which was
the adoption of a united state pricing system. Under this pricing system, the state-set
prices of goods, including those of energy, reflect neither the production costs nor the
influence of market forces. The structure of state-set prices was also irrational: the same
type of goods was set at the same prices regardless of their qualities, thus resulting in the
underpricing and undersupply of goods of high quality. Over a very long period, this
pricing system remained unchanged so that its inflexible and restrictive nature became
increasingly apparent.
In 1984, the government required state-owned enterprises (SOEs) to sell up to a
predetermined quota of goods at state-set prices but allowed to sell above the quota or
surplus at prices within a 20 percent range above the state-set prices. In February 1985,
the 20 percent limit was removed and prices for surplus could be negotiated freely
between buyers and sellers (Wu and Zhao, 1987). At that point, the dual pricing system
was formally instituted. Such a pricing system introduced, among others, economic
efficiency in the use of resources and was generally considered a positive, cautious step
towards a full market price. 1 Based on a survey of 17 provincial markets in March 1989,
SOEs still received allocation for part of their energy inputs, particularly crude oil and
electricity, at the state plan prices much lower than their market prices, after four years of
introducing the dual pricing system (Zhang, 1998).
Confronted with energy shortage and insufficient energy conservation investment,
China had been reforming its energy prices as part of sweeping price reforms initiated in
1993. The pace and scale of the energy pricing reform differ across energy types. This
article discusses the evolution of price reforms for coal, petroleum products, natural gas,
electricity and renewable power, provides some analysis of these energy price reforms,
and suggests that few areas of reforms could take place in order to have the market to
play a decisive role in allocating resources.

2. Coal prices
Coal dominates in China’s energy mix. Its price has been set differently since 1993,
depending on its use. Under a two track system for coal prices, the price of coal for non1

See Wu and Zhao (1987) and Singh (1992) for general discussion on pros and cons of
the dual pricing system and Albouy (1991) for its impact on coal.
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utility use, the so-called “market coal”, was determined by the market, whereas the price
of coal for utility use, the so-called “power coal”, was based on “guidance price” set by
the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC), often at rates lower than
prevailing market rates. Coal producers are required to sell to large power producers at
the controlled prices for utility coal (IEA, 2009). However, as the increasing portion of
coal is used for utility and coal prices have risen over the years while power tariffs
remained fixed, electricity generators found it increasingly difficult to obtain coal and
cover the cost of generation (Rosen and Houser, 2007). In 2004, the NDRC abolished its
guidance price for power coal and set price bands for negotiations between coal
producers and electricity generators. The NDRC widened those bands in 2005; in 2006 it
scrapped them altogether (Williams and Kahrl, 2008).
With electricity tariffs remaining controlled and flat, many electricity generators
were unable to absorb the ensuing fuel cost increases and suffered huge losses. To
respond to electricity generators’ concerns, the NDRC proposed in May 2005 a coalelectricity price “co-movement” mechanism through which electricity tariffs were raised
if coal prices rose by 5 percent or more in no less than six months and allowed electricity
generators to pass up to 70 percent of increased fuel costs on to grid companies, and grid
companies to pass costs on to consumers. However, because of fears of inflation, the comovement policy had not been implemented even if the conditions met, and power tariffs
continue to remain flat while coal prices rise (Li, 2009; Williams and Kahrl, 2008;
Fisher-Vanden, 2009). This had put greater pressure on electricity generators and led to
lobbying efforts on the part of generators to receive higher tariffs.
In December 2012, the State Council announced to abolish the two track system
for coal prices. The price of coal for utility use will also be determined by the market just
as the price of coal for non-utility use does. Moreover, it revises the coal-electricity price
“co-movement” mechanism. Under the revised mechanism, electricity tariffs would be
adjusted if fluctuations in coal prices go beyond by 5 percent or more in 12 months and
electricity generators are allowed to pass up to 90 percent of increased fuel costs on to
grid companies instead of the existing 70 percent threshold (The State Council, 2012).
To implement the co-movement mechanism in a more open and transparent
manner, the NDRC (2015) in December 2015 further specified the details of its operation.
Since the beginning of 2016, within an one-year cycle, electricity tariffs would be
adjusted if utility coal prices increased by within the range of Yuan 30-150 per ton
relative to the 2014 average reference prices for utility coal. The more fluctuations in
coal prices, the less co-movement coefficients are. When coal prices rise below Yuan 30
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per ton, generators have to absorb all the fuel cost increases, whereas coal prices rise
beyond Yuan 150 per ton, the co-movement mechanism is not triggered either.
It should be pointed out that this co-movement mechanism is not an automatic
trigger mechanism, implying that it may not be implemented even if the conditions met.
Indeed, the average increases in coal prices in the whole year of 2017 fell in the
aforementioned range in the beginning of 2018, but the co-movement mechanism had not
been implemented. This may be because implementing the co-movement mechanism by
raising power tariffs will hurt downstream power users’ profitability in the current less
favorable economic environment worldwide.

3. Petroleum product prices
Domestic crude oil prices have since 1998 tracked international prices, but this has not
been the case with petroleum products. While China has since raised its producer prices
of gasoline and diesel several times, domestic oil refiners have still been feeling the pinch
as crude oil prices have been since linked directly to international prices and thus have
been allowed to rise, but refined oil product prices have not. To address this disconnect,
the government has implemented since May 2009 the pricing mechanism whereby
domestic petroleum product prices would be adjusted upward if the moving average of
international crude oil prices based on the composited Brent, Dubai and Cinta crude oil
price rose by more than 4 percent within 22 consecutive working days. However, this 22working-day cycle of price adjustments has triggered wide complaints, as it often failed
to reflect fluctuations in the international market.
To better reflect refiners’ costs and timely adapt to fluctuations in global crude oil
prices, the NDRC launched in March 2013 a market-oriented petroleum product pricing
mechanism. This automatic pricing mechanism shortens the 22-working-day adjustment
period to 10-working-day and remove the 4 percent threshold. The composition of the
basket of crudes, to which oil prices are linked, is also adjusted (Liu, 2012; Zhu, 2013).
The NDRC in January 2016 further specified that no price adjustments will be
made if international crude oil prices fall below US$40 per barrel. Confronted with high
costs of domestic production, this floor price is said to maintain domestic production
close to current level, in response to China’s stagnating domestic oil production and a
growing hunger for foreign oil (Zhang, 2016).

4. Natural gas prices
4
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Natural gas price has long been set below the producers’ production costs, and does not
reflect the relationship between its supply and demand, or alternative fuel prices. This has
not only led Chinese domestic gas producers to be reluctant to increase investments in
production, but also has constrained the imports of more costly natural gas from abroad.
In June 2010, China increased domestic producer price of natural gas by 25 percent (Wan,
2010). In December 2011, China carried out the pilot reform of natural gas pricing
mechanism in Guangdong province and the Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous region. This
reform changes the long held cost-plus pricing method to the “netback market value
pricing” approach. Under this pricing mechanism, pricing benchmarks are selected and
are pegged to prices of alternative fuels that are formed through market forces to establish
price linkage mechanism between natural gas and its alternative fuels (NDRC, 2011).
Since July 2013, the pilot scheme in Guangdong and Guangxi was implemented
nationwide for any volumes above the 2012 gas consumption level. At the same time,
natural gas prices were raised for non-residential users based on a two-tiered approach.
Under this reform, the NDRC sets caps on city-gate gas prices for different provinces,
instead of setting the ex-factory prices for domestic onshore and imported piped gas,
while consumers and suppliers are allowed to negotiate their specific prices as long as the
prices do not exceed the ceilings. Moreover, a lower price is set for the 2012
consumption volume, with the city-gate prices capped. A higher price is set for any
volumes above the 2012 consumption level. This price is pegged to 85 percent of the
basket price of alternative fuels such as fuel oil and liquefied petroleum gas using 60
percent and 40 percent weight respectively. The government aims to steadily raise the
lower tier prices so that both price bands converge by 2015 (NDRC, 2013c). Given
declining costs of alternative fuels, natural gas prices for non-residential users were
lowered in November 2015 and again in September 2017 (NDRC, 2015 and 2017b,c).
Given that residential natural gas prices have been capped at much lower levels
than those for non-residential users, provinces like Jiangsu, Henan and Hunan
implemented tier-tariffs for household use of natural gas. The NDRC (2014) in March
2014 mandated to lunch this pricing mechanism across the whole country before the end
of 2015. The pricing mechanism set three price bands associated with three tier levels of
consumption, with the first covering 80 percent of the average monthly consumption
volumes for household users, and the second the next 15 percent. The third tier would
cover any consumption above 95 percent of the monthly household average.
Consumption at the second and third tiers are accordingly charged at 120 percent and 150
percent of the first tier price (NDRC, 2014). Based on the guidance and taking its own
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circumstance into account, each province determines the consumption volume at each tier
level.
In the meantime, China has gradually let the market to determine the prices for a
variety of gas. Since 2013, the prices of shale gas, coalbed methane and coal gas have
completely been liberalized. Since then, LNG prices since September 2014, prices for all
other direct users except for gas used for fertilizers since April 2015, prices of gas storage
facilities since October 2016, and prices of natural gas for fertilizers since November
2016 have been liberalized. Fujian province has since November 2016 piloted city-gate
gas prices. Since September 2017, all volumes traded at the Shanghai and Chongqing gas
exchange centers are set by the market (NDRC, 2013c, 2015 and 2017b).
As the result of these market-oriented natural gas pricing reforms, over 80 percent
of natural gas consumption of non-residential users are determined by the market, of
which more than 50 percent are completely set by the market, and around 30 percent are
set by the flexible mechanism characterized by the reference prices supplemented with
allowed fluctuation ranges (NDRC, 2017c; Zhu, 2017). Despite significant progress,
more work needs to be done to formulate a fully market-oriented price. On specific prices,
reforms involve introducing differential pricing policies to reflect seasonal price
disparities, off-peak price disparities, interruptive gas prices and gas storage prices. More
fundamentally, further progress in natural gas pricing reforms requires the deepening
reform of overall natural gas industry chain under the guidance principle of “opening the
natural gas upstream-and-downstream market and regulating the midstream pipeline
transport market”, as market-oriented natural gas price can only be formed based on a
competitive natural gas industry structure. The NDRC has been laying the foundation for
third party access to pipeline network by reforming the network transportation price
mechanism under the principle of allowable costs plus reasonable profits. The NDRC
(2017a) in August 2017 released the verified pipeline network transportation costs of 13
natural gas long distance pipeline transport enterprises under the common method,
principle and standards. On average, the verified pipeline network transportation costs of
these enterprises are cut by 15 percent, reducing the burden of Yuan 10 billion on
downstream enterprises (Zhu, 2017). The National Energy Administration needs to
develop a third-party access policy so that parties as well as the owners are able to access
the pipeline network, starting formulating specific procedures and regulations for pipeline
network access and establishing a platform for pipeline network information disclosure
and access. Moreover, various types of investors should be encouraged to participate in
the construction of pipeline networks, LNG terminals, gas storage facilities, and other
related facilities. By ownership unbundling, setting up an independent system operator
6
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and building an independent transmission operator, China could gradually separate
natural gas pipeline transport and natural gas production and marketing, eventually
leading to the independence of the natural gas pipeline network (Dong et al., 2017).

5. Electricity tariffs
The electricity industry in China was nationalized since its government assumed power in
1949, and has been in a process of reforms since the 1980s (Ngan, 2010; Zeng et al.,
2016). In 2002, the State Council (2002) issued the unbundling reform of “separating
power plants from grids”. By dismantling the vertically integrated power system into
independent companies, this was the first attempt to establish a market-oriented
mechanism and has since framed China’s power management mechanism. While China’s
unbundling reform has accomplished a degree of success in the generation sector (Xie et
al., 2012), electricity tariffs have remained controlled by the central government since
China split State Power Corporation and separated electricity generation from its
transmission and distribution in 2002. While electricity tariffs were raised few times
under the aforementioned coal-electricity price “co-movement” mechanism, they still
remain flat and regulated. This not only reduces the effectiveness of addressing the
daunting challenges to cut emissions and strengthen industrial upgrading, but also
complicates implementing the pilot carbon trading schemes in the power sectors in China.
The latter creates a new impetus for power pricing reforms to allow the pass-through of
carbon costs in the electricity sector as a result of implementing carbon trading.
China has launched a new round of power industry reform since March 2015
(CCCPC and the State Council, 2015). The pricing mechanism reform features prominent
in this round. Grids will not make profits by charging the gap between on-grid price and
the electricity price for users. Instead, grids are supposed to earn their source of income
by charging transmission and distribution fee, which is determined by the NDRC. As
piloted in Yunnan province, large power users are encouraged to directly negotiate with
generators. Generators then sell power to grids at transaction prices, which are negotiated
by generators and users. As a result, the transaction price, transmission and distribution
fee and government funds combined form the price of electricity for these types of
industrial and commercial users, whose power use accounts for over 80 percent of the
national power use. The volume of power transacted and traded on the market increased
from 10 percent in 2015 to 23 percent of total electricity sale in 2016 (Zhu, 2017). The
government aims to further increase this portion. Meantime, tariffs for residential and
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agricultural power use remain regulated by the government (CCCPC and the State
Council, 2015).
In the course of this long-awaited comprehensive and complex power pricing
reform, the government has offered power price premium for desulfurization and
denitrification, and has charged differentiated power tariffs and tiered power tariffs for
the purpose of saving electricity and protecting the environment (NDRC, 2013a,b; NDRC
and MIIT, 2013).
5.1 Power price premium for desulfurization and denitrification
With burning coal contributing 90 percent of the national total SO2 emissions and coalfired power generation accounting for half of the national total, the Chinese central
government had mandated that new coal-fired units must be synchronously equipped
with a flue gas desulphurization (FGD) facility and that plants built after 1997 must have
begun to be retrofitted with a FGD facility before 2010. During the 12th five-year period,
Eelectricity generators were mandated to install flue gas denitrification facility as well.
All coal-fired plants with unit capacity of 300 megawatt (MW) or more across the
country and with unit capacity of 200 MW in eastern part of the country and the capitals
of other provinces or equivalent are mandated to install denitrification facility.
While electricity tariffs remain controlled and flat, the government offered since
2004 a premium for all new coal-fired units. Given that China’s SO2 emissions in 2005
were mandated to keep at the 2000 level but actually were 5 percent more than the 2000
level, the government decided to extend since 2007 this premium to electricity generated
by existing coal-fired power plants (that is, those built before 2004) with FGD facility
installed to encourage the installation and operation of FGD facility at large coal-fired
power plants (NDRC and SEPA, 2007). The premium was equivalent to the average
estimated cost of operating the technology. Other policies favorable to FGD-equipped
power plants are implemented, e.g., priority given to be connected to grids, and being
allowed to operate longer than those plants that do not install desulphurization capacity.
Some provincial governments provide even more favorable policies, leading to priority
dispatching of power from units with FGD in Shandong and Shanxi provinces. Combined
with the declining capital cost of FGD, newly installed desulphurization capacity in 2006
was greater than the combined total over the past 10 years, accounting for 30 percent of
the total installed thermal (mostly coal-fired) capacity. By 2011, the portion of coal-fired
units with FGD rose to 90 percent in 2011 of the total installed thermal capacity from
13.5 percent in 2005 (Sina Net, 2009; CEC and EDF, 2012). As a result of this incentive
compatible policy, China had met the 2010 target of a 10 percent cut one year ahead of
8
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schedule. Harvard China Project estimates that China’s SO2 reduction policy in the 11th
five-year plan period resulted in negative economic costs and enormous human health
benefits -- from 12,000 to 74,000 avoided premature deaths in 2010 (Nielsen and Ho,
2013).
The government also offered since November 2011 a premium for electricity
generated by power plants with flue gas denitrification facility in 14 provinces or
equivalent. Since the beginning of 2013, the price premium for denitrification was
extended to all coal-fired power plants equipped with denitrification facility (NDRC,
2013a), and was further increased to 0.01 RMB/kWh since September 2013 (NDRC,
2013b).
5.2 Differentiated power tariffs
NDRC (2006) ordered provincial governments to implement the differentiated tariffs that
charge more for companies classified as ‘eliminated types’ or ‘restrained types’ in eight
energy-guzzling industries including cement, aluminum, iron and steel, and ferroalloy
from October 1, 2006 onwards. While provinces like Shanxi charged even higher
differentiated tariffs than the required levels by the central government (Zhang et al.,
2011), some provinces and regions have been offering preferential power tariffs to
struggling, local energy-intensive industries. The NDRC and other five ministries and
agencies jointly ordered utilities to stop offering preferential power tariffs to energyintensive industries by June 2010. Such industries will be charged with the punitive,
differentiated tariffs. Those utilities that fail to implement the differentiated tariffs will
have to pay a fine that is five times that of differentiated tariffs multiplied by the volume
of sold electricity (Zhu, 2010).
5.3 Tiered power tariffs
With residential electricity demand set to increase as income grows on the one hand and
the price of residential electricity remaining below actual costs on the other hand, NDRC
implemented three-tier-tariffs for household electricity use since July 2012. The
effectiveness of the new tariff mechanism depends on the price and income elasticities of
residential electricity demand among income groups. However, very little information
exists in China regarding these parameters. Based on the monthly micro-level data of
Beijing urban households from 2002 to 2009, Jin and Zhang (2013) estimate these two
parameters with both the almost-ideal-demand-system and the linear double-logarithmic
model specifications. Their estimated price elasticity is close to unity and increases as
9
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income grows. This suggests that it might be effective to use pricing policies for demandside management to adjust the electricity consumption of high-income groups. On the
other hand, given that the estimated income elasticity is low, supporting policies are
needed for low-income groups severely hit by increasing tariffs. In this regard, the
authors suggest that either directly subsidizing low-income families or rationally setting
the price levels of different tariff blocks can help improve the distributional effects of
tariff reform.
From the beginning of 2014, the NDRC expanded the three-tiered electrify
pricing approach to the aluminum sector to phase out outdated production capacity and
promote industrial restructuring more quickly (NDRC and MIIT, 2013; Gao, 2013).
Similar tiered power pricing policy applies to other industries, such as cement, to force
upgrades in the drive for sustained and healthy development.

6. Renewable power tariffs
From a long-term perspective, widespread use of renewable energy is a real solution.
Increasing the share of renewable energies in the total primary energy supply not only
enhances energy security, but also is environmentally friendly and conducive to good
health. China has targeted alternative energy sources to meet 15% of its energy
requirements by 2020 and has aimed the share of non-fossil fuel use to around 20% by
2030, respectively.
The Chinese government initially supported solar energy through so-called Golden
Sun investment subsidies (Zhang, 2011 and 2013). After years of simply taking
advantage of overseas orders to drive down the cost of manufacturing solar panels, feedin tariffs for solar power were enacted in July 2011 to create China’s own solar power
market. Wind power had benefited from bidding-based tariffs since 2003 (Zhang, 2010,
2011 and 2013). With total installed capacity of 5.9 GW at the end of 2007, China had
already surpassed its goal to achieve 5 GW in 2010, and China had met its 2020 target of
30 GW ten years ahead of schedule. With both power demand and new installations of
wind power capacity increasing faster than planned and the further deterioration of the
environment, combined with the fact that the country is facing great pressure both inside
and outside international climate negotiations to be more ambitious in combating global
climate change, China has raised its wind power target to 200 GW of wind power
capacity in operation by 2020. This revised target is 170 GW more than the 30 GW target
set in September 2007, and three times the UK’s entire current power capacity.
10
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In August 2009, this supportive policy for wind power was replaced by feed-in tariffs.
Under the policy, four wind energy areas were designated based on the quality of wind
energy resources and the conditions of project engineering construction (NDRC, 2009).
On-grid tariffs were set accordingly as benchmarks for wind power projects. The levels
were comparable to the tariffs that the NDRC had approved in the past several years in
most regions, and were substantially higher than that set through bidding. By letting
investors know the expected rate of return on their projects through announcing on-grid
tariffs upfront, the Chinese government aims to encourage the development of wind
energy resources of good quality. In the meantime, this will encourage wind power plants
to reduce the costs of investment and operation and increase their economic efficiency,
thus promoting the healthy development of the whole wind industry in China (Zhang,
2010, 2011 and 2013).
Under the Renewable Energy Law, registered power generators are granted access to
grids, which are mandated to purchase the full amount of generated renewable energy.
Moreover, over the past ten years, the cost of wind power projects has been declining
(IRENA, 2018) but on-grid tariffs benchmarks in each zone remained unchanged until
2015. These induce wind power developers to focus only on production costs side and
overlook the demand side, and thus have led to a huge surplus in installed capacity, in
particular in northern and western China of richer wind resources where the installed
capacity is concentrated but are far from the load center. Consequently, a large amount of
generated wind power has to be curtailed due to limited local demand or grid system
stability constraints (Xia and Song, 2017). Moreover, China now aims to increase its total
installed wind power capacity to 200 GW by 2020 and implements a green dispatch
system to favor renewable power generation in the electric grid. In this context, China
needs to significantly improve its power grids and coordinate the development of wind
power with the planning and construction of power grids, including smart grids. New
transmission lines should be constructed at the same time wind power farms are built.
Given the significantly scaled-up wind power capacity planned for 2020, China should
now place more emphasis on companies ensuring the actual flow of power to the grid
than on meeting capacity (Zhang, 2010, 2011 and 2014). Taken all these issues together,
the policies of feed-in-tariff and guarantee of renewable power purchase need to adapt to
the new situation and alternative policies need to explore to solve curtailment problem
and to encourage the wind power developers to choose locations close to the load center.

7. Conclusions
11
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China has determined to assign the market a decisive role in allocating resources. To
have the market to play that role, getting the energy prices right is crucial. Since 1984,
China has been making great efforts towards reforming energy prices, and has
accomplished great achievements. However, such reforms are far from complete. While
under the current pricing mechanism for petroleum products petroleum product prices
fluctuates along with global crude oil prices, they decouple from the domestic market.
The future reform of petroleum product pricing mechanism should take domestic factors
into account so that petroleum product prices can better reflect the relationship between
domestic supply and demand. From a long-term perspective, however, a complete
marketedlization of petroleum product prices depends on the extent to which the central
government is able to break down the monopoly power of the three national oil
corporations in oil imports, exploration, production and pipeline networks.
While over 80 percent of natural gas consumption of non-residential users are
determined by the market, more work needs to be done to formulate a fully marketoriented price. Fundamentally, further progress in natural gas pricing reforms requires the
deepening reform of overall natural gas industry chain under the guidance principle of
“opening the natural gas upstream-and-downstream market and regulating the midstream
pipeline transport market”. In this context, reforming the network transportation price
mechanism and laying the foundation for third party access to pipeline network are
crucial. The NDRC moves in the right direction, verifying the pipeline network
transportation costs of natural gas long distance pipeline transport enterprises under the
common method, principle and standards. It needs to develop a third-party access policy
so that parties as well as the owners are able to access the pipeline network. Gradually,
China could separate natural gas pipeline transport and natural gas production and
marketing, eventually leading to the independence of the natural gas pipeline network.
While China has been reforming its electricity industry structure since 2002,
transmission, distribution and sale of electricity are undertaken by two main grid
corporations, the State Grid and China Southern Power Grid. As the designated sole
buyers of electricity from generators, and distributors and sellers of electricity, they hold
monopolies in their respective areas. Their monopoly power and the lack of competition
in the electricity market have often attracted criticism. However, in my view, splitting
grid is not a necessary option to achieve this goal, but separating electricity sale from
grid’s transmission and distribution is a must for establishing a competitive power market.
Only then can the electricity sale side be opened up, and electricity selling companies
independent of grids, can be set up in each region. This has been the key goal of a new
round of power industry reform China has launched since March 2015. Grids will not
12
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make profits by charging the gap between on-grid price and the electricity price for users.
Instead, grids are supposed to earn their source of income by charging transmission and
distribution fee, which is determined by the NDRC. However, this mode of verified
transmission and distribution fee could confront with a variety of thorny issues. One is
power dispatching when selling prices differ but the grids’ source of income is already set
based on this mode. Other could be how to lower power tariffs. This requires either
power generators or grids giving up some profits in the whole value chain, given that
power generators have low profit margin and the grids’ source of income is based on the
verified transmission and distribution fee and allowable profits. Regarding renewable
power, the policies of feed-in-tariff and guarantee of renewable power purchase help
widespread use of renewable power. Going forward, these favorable policies need to
adapt to the new situation of surplus and mismatch between generation locations and the
load center, and alternative policies need to explore to solve curtailment problem and to
encourage the wind power developers to choose locations close to the load center, in
addition to increasing the grid transmission capacity and transporting electricity from
western and northern China to southeastern China by building more ultra-high voltage
transmission lines.
For coal, whether the revised coal-electricity price “co-movement” mechanism is able
to address potential conflict of coal producers and power generators remains to be seen.
This is because an one-year cycle of adjustment is long and the reference prices for utility
coal remain stable, relative to the rapid pace of China’s overall reform and the rapidly
changing market conditions. Moreover, though the two track system for coal prices has
been abolished, it is still very difficult to establish a nationwide coal market as railway
freight capacity has not been liberalized. This means that if the train wagons are not
included for liberalizing, coal purchased cannot reach the load centers. Thus, future
reform has to be undertaken from a perspective of a whole coal value chain, targeting
reform of those parts of the whole value chain, which need to be liberalized but are, to a
large extent, still controlled by the government. However, even if such reform is
undertaken, coal prices would not fully reflect the cost of production because of officially
controlled costs and distorted prices in other production factors. Coal prices also do not
include negative externalities. Clearly, the imposition of market-based environmental
instruments can internalize externality costs into the market prices. Indeed, implementing
carbon trading not only creates a new impetus for power pricing reforms to allow the
pass-through of carbon costs in the electricity sector, but can also help internalize
externality costs into the market prices.
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